This essay proposes a comprehensive mark-to-market tax for the 0.1% wealthiest and highest-earning taxpayers. Publicly-traded securities would be subject to an annual mark-to-market tax. Nontraded assets would be subject to a "deemed mark-to-market" tax: They would not be subject to tax until sale or other disposition (including gift, donation, or death) 
This essay proposes a comprehensive mark-to-market tax for the 0.1% wealthiest and highest-earning taxpayers. Publicly-traded securities would be subject to an annual mark-to-market tax. Nontraded assets would be subject to a "deemed mark-to-market" tax: They would not be subject to tax until sale or other disposition (including gift, donation, or death) , but at that time, the taxpayer would be taxed at an amount that would leave the taxpayer with the value he or she would have had if the asset appreciated constantly over its holding period, had been subject annually to a mark-to-market tax, and the taxpayer had sold a portion of the asset each year to pay the tax. Taxpayers would be permitted to annually mark their nontraded assets to market, and deposit an amount of tax based on that valuation. This deposit would accrue at the after-tax yield of the asset for purposes of a credit against the tax due upon a sale. Thus, a 
taxpayer that reports gain and deposits tax each year based on the ultimate annual yield of an asset would not owe any additional tax with respect to that asset at maturity. Losses would remain on a realization basis, but losses would be deemed to have accrued over the taxpayer's holding period based on the asset's yield, could be used to offset deemed gain, and could be carried forward indefinitely.
Although a revenue estimate is inherently speculative, a comprehensive mark-to-market tax at current capital gains rates could raise nearly a trillion dollars of new revenue over the next ten years; at ordinary income rates, over $1.6 trillion dollars.
I.
Background.
I have previously proposed a mark-to-market regime for the publicly-traded securities of the 0.1% wealthiest and highest-earning taxpayers. 2 The most persistent criticism of that regime is its failure to tax the nontraded assets (i.e., all assets other than publicly-traded assets) of those taxpayers. If publicly-traded securities are subject to a mark-to-market tax, but nontraded assets remain on a realization basis, then taxpayers would continue to avoid tax on their nontraded assets. Taxpayers would also have a strong incentive to shift their assets from publicly-traded securities into nontraded assets. Because the regime would apply only to the 0.1% highest-earning taxpayers ($2.5 million or more of annual gross income) 3 and the 0.1% wealthiest taxpayers ($20.6 million or more of publicly-traded assets) 4 this incentive would be greatest for taxpayers with insufficient income, but ample publicly-traded securities, who could entirely avoid the regime if they shifted enough of their publicly-traded assets into nontraded assets in order to stay below the $20.6 million publicly-traded asset threshold. While there are responses to these concerns, this essay addresses them directly by proposing to tax the nontraded assets of the 0.1% wealthiest and highest-income taxpayers on a retrospective yieldbased "deemed mark-to-market" basis.
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I had considered an interest charge on deferred tax, similar to the "passive foreign investment corporation" (or "PFIC) regime, section 1260, 6 and the regime for taxing accumulation distributions from foreign trusts. I rejected an interest charge for three reasons.
First, ultimately, the rate would be arbitrary. The underpayment rate used for PFICs, section 1260, and foreign trusts is widely perceived as too high. The risk-free rate would be too low. It would be impossible to pick a correct rate for all taxpayers. Second, an interest rate regime is very different than a mark-to-market regime, so there would remain a meaningful disparity of treatment between publicly-traded and nontraded assets. Finally, even if the correct rate could be chosen, an interest charge encourages taxpayers to defer paying the tax until they can evade it, or until a future Congress repeals it. There is a strong benefit to imposing the tax sooner rather than later.
I had also considered a regime that would require taxpayers to value their nontraded assets, and pay tax currently on the value, annually or periodically (i.e., every ten years). However, I am inherently skeptical about any valuation for assets that do not trade. I also don't think that the IRS could administer such a regime, and I do not believe that Congress would grant the IRS the power to conduct extensive valuation audits of individuals.
This essay first summarizes the comprehensive tax. Because I have written extensively on the mark-to-market component for publicly-traded securities, this essay describes that aspect only summarily, and focuses instead on the deemed mark-to-market tax for nontraded assets.
Part II of the essay summarizes the comprehensive regime and its benefits. Part III discusses some of the significant features of the deemed mark-to-market component. Part IV explores the amount of revenue that a comprehensive mark-to-market tax could generate. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. Summary of the Comprehensive Mark-to-Market Tax.
Individuals would be subject to the comprehensive mark-to-market tax if they are among the 0.1% highest-earning (currently assumed to be $2.5 million) or richest (currently $20.6 million).
A. The Mark-to-Market Tax for Publicly-Traded Securities.
A mark-to-market tax would be imposed on the publicly-traded securities and derivatives with respect to publicly-traded securities of the 0.1% highest earning and wealthiest individuals. Only appreciation after the date of enactment would be subject to the mark-tomarket tax, but death, gifts, and donations to tax-exempt organizations would be treated as realization events so that all appreciation would eventually be subject to income tax. All companies that are not publicly-traded would be treated as flow-throughs for tax purposes.
B.
The Deemed Mark-to-Market Tax for Nontraded Assets.
Under the deemed market-to-market regime, taxpayers would not be subject to tax on their nonpublicly-traded assets until realization. However, upon the sale or other disposition (including a gift, death, or donation) of a nontraded asset, the deemed mark-tomarket regime would impose a tax that would leave the taxpayer with the after-tax amount that would have resulted had the asset appreciated constantly at the pre-tax yield, the taxpayer had been taxed annually on a mark-to-market basis, and the taxpayer had sold enough of the asset to pay the tax.
Mechanically, at the time of realization, the taxpayer would determine the yield of her investment since acquisition, and would assume that the investment appreciated on a constant basis over her holding period based on that yield. The taxpayer would then determine the mark-to-market tax that would have been due on the deemed gain that arose in each year.
Finally, with respect to each year, the taxpayer would determine the future value of the tax in the year of realization based on the after-tax yield of the asset, expressed as [pre-tax yield x (1 -tax rate)]. The tax due upon realization would be the sum of the future values of the tax liabilities for each year of the taxpayer's holding period. The amount of tax is also equal to the future value of the tax that a taxpayer would pay each year (discounted at the pre-tax yield of the asset), assuming her asset appreciated constantly, she was taxed
In a straight forward case, the taxpayer's tax can be expressed by the formula
Where P is the proceeds, a is the initial investment, r is the pre-tax internal rate of return, g is the tax rate, and t is the number of years the asset is held.
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A yield-based tax can be expensive for the taxpayer. For example, an investment purchased for $5 million and sold ten years later for $25 million has a yield of 17.5%.
At a 23.8% tax rate, the tax under current law would be $4.76 million ($20 million gain times 23.8%). The deemed mark-to-market tax (at the after-tax yield of 13.3%) would be $7.56 million. 9 This is because the deemed mark-to-market tax in each year accrues at the after-tax yield of 13.3% until the investment is sold and the tax is paid.
To mitigate this aspect of the yield-based tax, taxpayers would be permitted to value their nonpublicly-traded assets in each year (i.e., mark-them-to-market), report the gain, and deposit tax in each year based on the valuation. The valuation and deposit would be entirely voluntary. There would be no limit on the valuation or the deposit and they would not be challengeable. The deposit would be deem to accrue at whatever the after-tax yield (yield x [1 -annually on a mark-to-market basis, and she sold enough of her asset each year to pay the tax. See column L in https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_ddrsSt7ozi1cvKR0hh_fqIn_eQ-O7pZi32r0qyucOE/edit?usp=sharing.
8 I thank Eric Toder for this formula.
This formula is not appropriate if tax rates or the taxpayer's basis changes during her holding period (e.g., due to deprecation).
If the tax rate changed between the time an asset was purchased and the time it was sold, the taxpayer would use the rate in each year of her holding period.
tax rate]) turns out to be upon realization, and this accrual would be credited against the tax liability on the asset. However, the amount of tax that a taxpayer would pay upon realization must always be at least equal to the current-law realization-based tax (i.e., gain times tax rate).
In other words, if the actual amount of the deposit is less than the realization-based tax, the taxpayer would be required to pay the difference, even if the deemed accrual on the deposit exceeds the tax due. If the actual deposit exceeds the tax due, the taxpayer could receive a refund, but accruals on the deposit in excess of the tax due would not entitle the taxpayer to a refund.
Losses would remain on a realization basis. However, recognized losses would be deemed to accrue over the holding period of the asset, based on the yield of the asset and could be carried forward indefinitely. Losses could offset deemed mark-to-market gains. Thus, if a taxpayer buys two assets for $5 million each at the same time, does not deposit any tax with respect to either of them and, ten years later, sells one for $10 million and the other for nothing, the taxpayer would not owe any net tax.
Alternatively, for a taxpayer that is marking-to-market her nontraded assets and making deposits, and has an asset that she believes has appreciated by $100 and would deposit $23.80, but has a $100 loss in the same year, the taxpayer may report the $100 deemed mark-to-market gain, and offset it by the $100 recognized loss. Even though the taxpayer had not made a deposit, she would be deemed to have deposited $23.80 for purposes of the deemed mark-to-market regime.
Pre-enactment gains would remain on a realization basis; valuation for this purpose would be the value of the assets on the effective date, based on the yield of the asset, determined on realization.
Taxpayers whose income and asset levels are below the threshold in some years and above it in others would be subject to the deemed mark-to-market regime only in the years during which their wealth or income exceeds the threshold. Deposits with respect to gain during years that a taxpayer is not subject to the deemed mark-to-market system would accrue interest at the overpayment rate (rather than at the after-tax yield on the investment).
The regime would apply only to gain. It would not affect the taxation of income and expense. Thus, it would be relatively easy to incorporate into our current tax system.
The regime is flexible enough to incorporate exemptions for certain assets and phase-ins for taxpayers who are close to the thresholds. However, for purposes of revenue projections, this essay assumes that there are no exemptions or thresholds.
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C. The Benefits of the Comprehensive Mark-to-Market Tax.
Americans across the ideological spectrum now see income inequality as a major problem.
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There are many reasons why the wealth of the richest of the rich has increased disproportionately, but a major factor is the "realization requirement" of our tax system -the 10 This yield-based deemed mark-to-market tax differs in objective and approach from Alan Auerbach's yield-based tax. See Auerbach, supra note 4. Very generally, his proposal would treat each asset as if it had appreciated at the risk-free rate and then would charge interest on the tax deferred at the risk-free rate. (His approach is not an income tax; basis doesn't matter and his proposal would tax assets that sell at a loss.) His proposal also applies to distributions, so that distributions and gains are taxable consistently. His principal objective is to avoid the lock-in effect.
The objective of the comprehensive mark-to-market tax is somewhat different, and the difference between the Auerbach approach and the comprehensive mark-to-market tax reflect the different objectives. The principal objective of the mark-to-market component for publicly-traded assets is to tax economic income. The principal objective of the yield-based component for nontraded assets is a retrospective tax that achieves close parity with the mark-to-market tax on publicly-traded assets, but does not rely on valuations, is administrable, constitutional, and otherwise retains current law to the greatest extent possible. , http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/inequality-a-major-issuefor-americans-times-cbs-poll-finds.html ("The poll found that a strong majority say that wealth should be more evenly divided and that it is a problem that should be addressed urgently."); Richard Wike, Jan. 21, 2015) , http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/21/inequality-is-at-top-of-the-agenda-as-globalelites-gather-in-davos/ ("Americans across the ideological spectrum see it as a big problem, including majorities of Democrats (89%), independents (77%) and Republicans (60%) in the spring 2014 poll.").
Inequality is at Top of the Agenda as Global Elites Gather in Davos, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (
ability to avoid all income tax on appreciated assets by simply holding and never selling them.
The comprehensive mark-to-market tax is the only magic bullet for upper-tier inequality, and it would not redistribute. It would ensure that the wealthiest and highest-earning taxpayers pay at least some income tax on their unrealized economic income where today they pay none.
The comprehensive mark-to-market tax would represent the broadest base for an income tax, and therefore would raise a tremendous amount of revenue without raising rates (nearly $1 trillion/10 years). It can generate even more revenue ($1.66 trillion/10 years) if gains were taxable at current ordinary income rates.
The proposal is entirely agnostic on the use of the revenue generated by the proposal. I have previously suggested that both Democrats and Republicans could embrace a mark-to-market tax on the publicly-traded securities of the 0.1% richest and highest-earning taxpayers if the revenue was used to reduce the corporate income tax. The comprehensive tax would generate significantly more revenue, which could be used to reduce debt, increase social services, support infrastructure, reduce tax rates, or all of these.
The comprehensive mark-to-market tax would have no effect on any small business or middle income taxpayer, and it would affect only around 170,000 households.
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It would raise additional significant revenue for states without new legislation (the states would merely piggyback on the federal law).
In a downturn, the mark-to-market regime for publicly-traded securities, by generating significant refunds, could act as an automatic stimulus.
The comprehensive mark-to-market tax would achieve parity between wage 12 Saez and Zucman estimated that in 2012 there were 160,700 families in the top 0.1%. Saez & Zucman, supra note 3, at Table 1 . Because the regime applies to taxpayers who are among the 0.1% highest-earning but not necessarily the 0.1% wealthiest, the comprehensive tax would apply to more than 160,700 families.
earners, who now pay tax on all of their economic income, and entrepreneurs and investors, who can avoid all tax on their appreciated investments. 13 For this reason, the comprehensive tax would be superior to a wealth tax, which would impose double tax (income tax and wealth tax) on entertainers and professional athletes, but only the wealth tax on entrepreneurs and investors (who would continue to avoid income tax on their appreciated investments).
And, finally, the comprehensive mark-to-market tax would clearly be constitutional; a wealth tax would be constitutionally suspect. Tax. A. The Basic Rule.
III. Discussion of the Deemed Mark-to-Market
As mentioned above, no tax would be imposed with respect to a nontraded asset until its sale or other disposition (including a gift, death, or donation). At that time, the taxpayer would determine the yield of his investment, and would assume that the investment had appreciated on a constant basis over his holding period, based on that yield. The taxpayer would then determine the mark-to-market tax that would have been due on the deemed gain that arises in each year. Finally, the taxpayer would determine the future value of the tax based on the after-tax yield of the asset, expressed as [pre-tax yield x (1 -tax rate)]. The tax due upon realization would be the sum of the future values of the tax liabilities for each year of the taxpayer's holding period.
Example One. Assume that the regime is enacted in 2015 with an effective date of January 1, 2016, the tax rate is 23.8%, and a taxpayer purchases an asset for $5 million on Since the proceeds from the sale were $25 million, and the after-tax deemed asset has a value of $17.44 million, the taxpayer would owe tax of $7,561,959.39. (Under current law, the tax would be $4.76 million.) The tax is more than one and a half times the tax payable under current law because the tax deemed payable accrues at the yield of the investment, which in this case is quite high.
B. Tax Deposits.
To avoid the high tax rate, the taxpayer would be permitted to value the asset in each year (i.e., mark-it-to-market) and deposit tax in each year based on the valuation. (In fact, the taxpayer could deposit tax based on any valuation.) The deposit would accrue at whatever the after-tax yield (yield x [1 -tax rate]) on the asset turns out to be, and this accrual would be credited against the tax liability on the asset. However, the actual tax paid must equal at least the realization-based tax (at least $4.76 million in the example above). If the actual deposit exceeds the total tax due, the taxpayer could receive a refund, but otherwise, overpayments
would not result in refunds and could not be used to offset other gain or income. Accordingly, in
Example One, the taxpayer would not have an incentive to make deposits exceeding $4.76 million.
Example Two. The facts are the same as in the Example One, except that the taxpayer values the asset in each year to reflect a 17.5% annual yield, and deposits tax based on the appreciation each year.
Date Valuation
Deposit (equal to tax on appreciation) This deposit would be $2.3 million less than the $4.76 million that would be owed under current law's realization rule. Effectively, the taxpayer would be buying a long forward contract from the government with respect to the asset. This is too generous. For this reason, the regime requires that the taxpayer pay a minimum amount of tax equal to the tax that would be payable under current law's realization system. In the examples thus far, this amount is $4.76 million.
So if the taxpayer did indeed deposit $2.46 million at the beginning of 2016, she would be required to pay an additional $2.3 million upon a sale or other recognition event.
Thus, generous early deposits minimize the tax payable, but not below the realization-based tax. that the asset had depreciated down to $6.42 million the following year (reflecting an aggregate 17.5% yield)? The taxpayer could either leave the deposit in place, or withdraw it in whole or in part. However, if the taxpayer withdrew all or a portion of the deposit, he wouldn't get any credit for the withdrawn portion.
As mentioned above, if a taxpayer overpays, he would receive no yield on the overpayment. Thus, if a taxpayer who buys a $5 million asset believes it has appreciated and deposits tax, but the asset in fact fails to appreciate, and is still worth $5 million upon a sale in 2025, then the taxpayer would receive a refund only of his deposit.
D. The Regime's Inherent Distrust of Valuations.
Example Six. Assume the same facts as Example One, except that the investment is in a drug company. The company has no drug discoveries until 2023 (and therefore the value is stable or depreciates), but in 2023 the company discovers the cure for a major disease and the investment appreciates to $25 million, where the value remains until sale. Even though the taxpayer perfectly valued her investment and deposited tax in accordance with that valuation, she would still owe $1,450,956.51 in 2025 (the difference between the $7.56 million that is due based on a deemed constant appreciation) and $6.11 million (the future value of the taxpayer's deposit). This is because the deemed mark-to-market system has an inherent distrust of valuations, and deems all assets to appreciate at a constant rate. However, if the taxpayer made a tax deposit of $5.89 million in 2023, she would not owe any tax in 2025. ($5.89 million grows to $7.56 million at a 13.3% rate and is greater than the realization-based tax of $4.76 million).
E. Losses.
Another consequence of the regime's inherent distrust of valuations is its denial of mark-to-market losses (and credit for mark-to-market losses). Instead, losses remain on a realization system under the regime. 18 However, recognized losses are deemed to accrue based on the yield of the asset, and can offset deemed mark-to-market gains in the years the losses accrued, and can be carried forward indefinitely. In addition, recognized losses can be used to make a deemed deposit. Thus, a taxpayer who thinks that an asset has appreciated by $100 and would deposit $23.80, but has a $100 recognized loss in the same year, the taxpayer may report the $100 deemed mark-to-market gain, offset it by the $100 recognized loss, and would be treated as if she had made a deposit of $23.80 (based on current capital gains rate).
Example Seven. Assume that a taxpayer purchases two assets on January 1, 2016: Asset one is purchased for $5 million and asset two is purchased for $25 million. On
December 31, 2025, asset one is sold for $25 million ($20 million gain) and asset two is sold for $10 million ($15 million loss). Asset one has a yield of 17.5%; asset two has a yield of -8.8%. 2022 $15,425,846.57 $2,293,207.55 $13,163,822 ($1,263,177) ($1,410,331.39) 12/31/2023 $18,119,491.59 $2,693,645.02 $12,011,244 ($1,152,578) $130,735.93 $31,115.15 $39,946.38 12/31/2024 $21,283,498.06 $3,164,006.47 $10,959,582 ($1,051,662) $2,112,344.40 $502,737.97 $569,632.10 12/31/2025 $25,000,000.00 $3,716,501.94 $10,000,000 ($959,582) $2,756,919.67 $656,146.88 $656,146 .88 $20,000,000.00 $15,000,000 $5,000,000.00 $1,190,000.00 $1,265,725.36
The gain on asset one would be deemed to accrue based on its yield (column B) and the loss on asset two would be deemed to accrue based on its yield (column E). The gains on asset one (column C) would be netted against the losses on asset 2, and excess losses would be carried forward (column F). Under this method, there would be net gains in 2023, 2024 and 2025. The tax (at a 23.8% rate) would be applied to that gain (column G). The deemed tax would accrue at the after-tax yield of 13.3% (column H). The tax due in 2025 would be $1.27 million. (The tax under current law would be $1.19 million).
F. Transition.
Example Eight. Assume that a taxpayer buys an asset on December 31, 2005
for $1 million, the regime is enacted effective as of January 1, 2016, and the taxpayer sells the asset for $25 million on December 31, 2025. The asset has a 17.5% yield, and therefore had a deemed value on the effective date of $5 million. Accordingly, on disposition, $4 million of gain is subject to realization, and the remaining $20 million of gain is subject to the deemed mark-tomarket regime. The taxpayer owes $952,000.00 of realization tax ($4 million * 23.8%), and
G. Accelerated Appreciation and Other Tax Expenditures.
The regime effectively negates the benefit of accelerated depreciation (and many other tax expenditures, such as like-kind exchanges and tax-free reorganizations) for the top 0.1% taxpayers who are subject to the comprehensive tax because any timing benefit from accelerated deduction (or other tax expenditure) would be offset by the yield-based tax on the deposit. If it is desirable to retain the benefits of accelerated depreciation for certain assets, these assets (or the gain attributable to the accelerated appreciation) could remain on a realization basis (or a credit, rather than a deduction, could be provided to taxpayers).
H.
In and Out of the Regime.
The regime applies only to the 0.1% wealthiest and highest-earning taxpayers.
This gives rise to two rules. First, to determine whether a taxpayer is in or out of the regime, the taxpayer's income is deemed to include the deemed gain in the asset's value, and the taxpayer's assets are deemed to include the deemed value of the asset. A very small group of taxpayers may not know whether they are in or out for decades after the fact.
Second, for a taxpayer who is in the top 0.1% for some years but not for others, the asset would be deemed to appreciate based on its yield, but the deemed mark-to-market tax would apply only for those years for which the taxpayer is in the regime. Deposits made in mark-to-market years would accrue at the asset's after-tax yield. Deposits made during realization years (by taxpayers who don't know that they will be under the realization regime for those years) would accrue at the overpayment rate.
Example Nine. Assume the same facts as Example Three, except that the taxpayer is subject to mark-to-market in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2023, 2024 and 2025, but not in 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 .
The taxpayer assumes that he is on mark-to-market in each year. The overpayment rate is 5%.
In this case, the deemed mark-to-market tax will accrue at the after-tax yield to $4.6 million. The realization tax will be $1.65 million ($6.93 gain times 23.8%). The tax due is $6.25 million, which is the sum of the mark-to-market tax and the realization tax.
I. Public Trading.
If a nontraded asset becomes publicly-traded (e.g., the IPO of a private company), the yield of the asset would be based on the initial public trading price, and the deemed mark-to-market tax on any gain would be fixed on that date. The tax may be paid immediately, but could be deferred until a realization event. However, the deemed mark-tomarket tax would accrue at the underpayment rate between the public-trading date and the date the tax is paid. Tax on pre-enactment gain would remain on a realization basis. Postenactment loss would become fixed as of the public trading date; it would remain on a realization basis, but could be carried back over the asset's holding period. Pre-enactment loss would remain on a realization basis subject to current law rules.
J. Exemptions and Phase Ins.
In its basic form, the deemed mark-to-market regime applies to all nontraded assets. However, Congress may wish to exempt certain assets for administrative or other reasons. For example, it would be administratively burdensome for taxpayers to have to make deposits with respect to jewelry and watches (within certain limits). The regime could easily exempt personal consumer items (such as jewelry, clothing, and furniture) that are purchased for less than $100,000, adjusted annually for inflation. 19 (It generally makes more sense to exempt items based on their purchase price rather than their sales price because a taxpayer who is unsure whether an item will be subject to the regime might very well wish to make tax 19 No exemption would be available for collectibles or automobiles.
deposits with respect to the asset.)
In addition, in its basic form, the regime would apply to any taxpayer with annual income in excess of $2.5 million, or assets in excess of $20.6 million. These thresholds create a cliff for taxpayers. The regime is flexible enough to permit Congress to exempt certain gain from the deemed tax. Thus, taxpayers whose income is between $2.5 million and $3 million, or whose wealth is between $20.6 million and $25 million could exclude from the regime a portion of the gain allocated to any year, or a portion of the overall gain recognized in any year.
For example, it would be possible to provide that taxpayers are subject to the mark-to-market tax on publicly-traded securities and the deemed-paid tax only to the extent that their adjusted gross income would exceed $2.5 million, or only to the extent their assets would exceed $20.6 million, taking into account the gain from the mark-to-market tax and the deemedpaid tax in each year.
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Example Eleven. The facts are the same as Example Nine, except that the taxpayer has no assets other than the nontraded asset and no income other than gain from the sale of the nontraded asset in 2025. The first step would be to determine the annual deemed value based on the 17.5% yield (column B). Then the appreciation each year would be determined (column C). Column D represents the excess of the deemed gain over the $2.5 million threshold. Because in 2016-2023, the taxpayer's total assets are less than $20.6 million, and the taxpayer's total income and gain (including deemed mark-to-market gain) is less than $2.5 million, the taxpayer would not be subject to the deemed mark-to-market tax in those years. In years 2023-2025, the taxpayer would be subject to the deemed mark-to-market tax.
First, the income threshold would be applied, and the taxpayer would be tentatively subject to the deemed mark-to-market tax only to the extent of the excess of deemed gain over $2.5 million (column D As discussed above, under the regime, taxpayers have a tremendous incentive to value their appreciated assets accurately (or generously) and deposit tax based on that valuation in order to avoid the potentially very expensive yield-based tax. Also, under the deemed mark-to-market tax, the accuracy of interim valuations isn't so important; what is more important is the ultimate yield of those deposits. Nevertheless, tax is minimized by early deposits and high valuations. Congress may desire greater discipline with respect to valuations.
It could, for instance, require periodic valuations (i.e., every ten years) and require that taxpayers' deposits reflect the valuation (or use the valuation as a floor). This requirement might make revenue estimates easier because the deposits will reflect taxpayers' best guess on mark-to-market valuation within the ten-year period used for revenue estimates. Alternatively, Congress could require the valuation that is used for deposits to be within a band of the valuation used for other purposes (i.e., loans or partial sales).
IV. Revenue.
Estimating the revenue that would be generated from the comprehensive tax is inherently speculative. Under the regime, publicly-traded securities would be marked to market.
It is likely that the tax deposited with respect to nontraded assets would be close to their market value because of the incentives of the regime. As mentioned above, to help ensure that taxpayers report gains equal to the post-enactment appreciation, a valuation could be required every ten years after enactment, and taxpayers could be required to deposit tax based on the valuation. For purposes of revenue estimating, I assume that the regime succeeds in taxing all of the post-enactment gains of the top 0.1% wealthiest taxpayers during the first ten years of enactment. There are reasons why the amount deposited could be greater or less. On the one hand, as described above, for an appreciated asset, the greater the amount deposited, the less tax ultimately paid (capped by the tax rate times the gain). On the other hand, because the valuations are voluntary, human nature may lead taxpayers to minimize the tax deposited. 22 The figures on total householder wealth come from an Excel file (Column C of The Tax Policy Center estimated that, in 2014, there would be 114,769 tax units within the top 0.1% that would report having capital gains or qualified dividend income in 2014. Multiplying 114,769 by the average amount of capital gains and qualified dividend income of $2,652,634 produces $304.44 billion. The Center also estimated that, in 2014, there would be total tax units of 162,816,000 and 17.3% would report capital gains of qualified dividend income. That means that 28.2 million taxpayers would report capital gains or qualified dividend income. The Center estimated that the average dollar value of gains and qualified dividend income that would be reported by taxpayers in 2014 would be $25,650. That means that the total reported capital gains would be $722.9 billion (28.2 million times $25,650). When the amount reported by the top 0.1% ($304.44 billion) is divided by the total amount of long-term capital gains and qualified dividend income ($722.9 billion), the resulting percentage is 42%.
Forty-two percent is nearly double the percentage of wealth (22%) Saez and Zucman believe is held by the top 0.1%. Saez & Zucman, supra note 3 at Table 1. Therefore using 42% would appear to be conservative.
